"Collapse" Held to Include "Cracking and Breaking" by unknown
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
"COLLAPSE" HELD TO INCLUDE "CRACKING AND
BREAKING"
Rogers v. Maryland Casualty Company
252 Iowa 1096, 109 N.W.2d 435 (1961)
Rogers sued to recover on an insurance policy which insured against
loss by "collapse of the building or any part thereof." Cracks had begun
to develop in the cement block and mortar walls of plaintiff's basement. The
cracks got wider, the walls bulged in, the mortar at the end of each block
gave way, and each crack resembled a stairway from the first layer above
the footing to the basement ceiling. From a judgment for the plaintiff
in the district court, the insurer appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa,
affirming the judgment of the district court, held that there was a "collapse
of the building" within the terms of the policy.1
Insuring clauses such as that in Rogers are relatively new and were
probably first incorporated into property damage insurance policies in
1954.2 Prior to such clauses, the only decisions construing "collapse" of
buildings dealt with the standard fire or accident policies. The standard
fire insurance policy contains a clause which terminates fire coverage upon
the "falling" of the building, except as the result of a fire.3 The intent of
this type of provision is to terminate the insurance on a building when it
falls abruptly into such an irregular mass that there is no longer an
insurable interest. Accident policies insure against injury to person or
personalty incurred by flying fragments of a collapsing building, wall or
ceiling 4 The courts in construing the intention of the contracting parties
in both of these types of coverage have held that the definition of "collapse"
connotes a sudden occurrence resulting in a falling, dropping or caving in.
Thus, courts in these earlier cases used a strict dictionary definition of
collapseY
Since the appearance of clauses in property damage policies similar
to that in Rogers, a split of authority has developed as to the construction
of the term "collapse." The first court6 to construe the clauses held that
I Rogers v. Maryland Cas. Co., 252 Iowa 1096, 109 N.V.2d 435 (1961).
2 Nugent v. General Ins. Co. of America, 253 F.2d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 1958).
3 Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1068 (1928).
4 Skelly v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 313 Pa. 202, 169 AtI. 78 (1933); Great Eastern Cas.
Co. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ga. App. 586, 94 S.E. 843 (1918); Rubenstein v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 339 Ill. App. 404, 90 N.E.2d 289 (1950).
SII Oxford English Dictionary 614: "To fall together, as the sides of a hollow
body, or the body itself, by external pressure or withdrawal of the contents, as when
an inflated bladder is pierced; to fall into a confused mass or into a flattened form
by loss of rigidity or support; to break down, give way, fall in, cave in; to shrink
suddenly into a small volume, contract."
6 Nugent v. General Ins. Co., supra note 2. It was not the contention of the plaintiff,
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the policy did not cover loss due to settling or sinking of the footings which
supported the dwelling walls. In Central Mutual Insurance Co. v. Royal,7
the Supreme Court of Alabama stated "the 'collapse of a building or any
part thereof' seems to be a clear and unambiguous statement . . ."s and
that "the plain and ordinary sense of the word collapse cannot be so
altered or warped to include within its meaning a movement of a structural
part of a building. ... ."9 All of the courts which have ruled "collapse"
unambiguous have adopted strict dictionary constructions of the term
and have cited as authority earlier decisions regarding fire and accident
insurance provisions. Such clauses are unambiguous in the sense that
they are intended by the contracting parties to connote a sudden falling
or crumbling which results in injury to objects contained in or near the
building. Such an intent may not exist when the contracting parties are
insuring the building itself against injury from "collapse."
The majority view was first set out in Travelers Fire Insurance Co. v.
Whaley. 10 The court distinguished a more liberal construction of "col-
lapse" in home owners' insurance protection from the strict dictionary
definition used in other types of coverage. The Whaley court ruled that
where an insurance contract does not specifically express the intent of the
collapse clause, the most realistic approach is to construe the terms in such
a contract as connoting a sinking, bulging or pulling away of the wall
which impairs its function as a supporting structure and destroys its
efficiency as a habitation." The liberal construction in Whaley has been
followed by the supreme courts of five states.12 The Supreme Court of
Kansas altered the test in holding that "the settling, falling, cracking, bulg-
ing, or breaking of the insured building or any part thereof in such a
Nugent, that the building as a whole had collapsed, but rather that the supporting foot-
ings were a part of the building and that a settling of these constituted a "collapse of a
part thereof" within the meaning of the policy.
7 269 Ala. 372, 113 So. 2d 680 (1959).
8 Id. at 372, 113 So. 2d at 681. It must be noted that only where a contract is
ambiguous and its language susceptible of different meanings do rules of construction
apply. See, e.g., Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Whaley, 272 F.2d 288 (loth Cir. 1959);
Nugent v. General Ins. Co. of America, supra note 2; Rogers v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
supra note 1; Jenkins v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 185 Kan. 665, 347 P.2d 417 (1959);
Anderson v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., 127 So. 2d 304 (La. 1961); Morton
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 Neb. 433, 106 N.W.2d 710 (1960); Gage v. Union Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 122 Vt. 246, 169 A.2d 29 (1961); Bradish v. British Am. Assur. Co., 9 Wis. 2d
601, 101 N.W.2d 814 (1960); Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1283 (1960).
) Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. Royal, supra note 7, at 373, 113 So. 2d at 681.
In a recent decision, Gage v. Union Mut. Fire Ins., supra note 8, the Supreme Court
of Vermont adopted the conclusions of the earlier cases.
1' Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Whaley, supra note 8.
11 Id. at 290.
12 Rogers v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 1; Jenkins v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., supra note 8; Anderson v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 8;




manner as to materially impair the basic structure or substantial integrity
of the building is to be regarded as a collapse of the building within such
clauses of the policy."' 3
The Iowa court in Rogers had to resolve two basic issues: first,
whether the term "collapse" is ambiguous and thus susceptible of more
than one meaning; and second, if the term is ambiguous, whether the
construction of the term "collapse" as alleged by the plaintiff (i.e., a
cracking, bulging, and crumbling) falls within the range of constructions
which might reasonably constitute a "collapse" at law.
The court in Rogers correctly refused to adopt the narrow meaning
given "collapse" in the minority decisions.14 The test of whether a term
is ambiguous is not based on what the insurer intended the words to mean,
but upon what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would
understand them to mean.' 5 Jurisdictions which have ruled that "collapse
of the building or any part thereof" is not ambiguous lose cognizance of
the reasonable intent of a person who has purchased such insurance pro-
tection. It is unreasonable to assume that the insured understood such
a phrase to provide coverage if and only if his home, or at least part
thereof, falls in an irregular mass or flattened form.' 6 The reasonable
intent of a person purchasing such coverage is to insure against loss
sustained when a breaking or bulging substantially impairs the structure
of his home. When this intent is not recognized by the courts, the home
owner purchases little added protection. In only an extremely small num-
ber of cases would a home fall into mere ruin unless catastrophes such as
explosion, earth movement, impact by an airplane or automobile, wind
storm or fire occurred. Such catastrophes are usually insured against in
other provisions of the home owner's policy. Therefore, when "collapse" is
termed unambiguous and construed strictly, the clause offers protection
only in rare cases when a complete falling in is not caused by a catastrophe.
Although insurance contracts written in Ohio insure against the "col-
lapse of the building or any part thereof," there has been no decision con-
struing the collapse clause of a home protection insurance policy. The
Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that courts should adopt a construction
favorable to the insured in the case of genuine ambiguity as to language in
an insurance policy.' 7 Yet, the Ohio court further concluded "that this
'3 Jenkins v. United States Fire Ins. Co., supra note 8, at 671-72, 347 P.2d at 422-23.
The Kansas court specifically attacked the approach which adopts the "so as to render the
building unsuitable for use as a dwelling" test of collapse. The approach of the Jenkins
and subsequent cases also appears contrary to the "loss of distinctive character as a
building" test noted in 72 AL.R.2d 1287 (1960).
14 Rogers v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra note 1, at 439: "We are not disposed to
disagree with five jurisdictions (including two that adjoin this state) which have
recently decided the question presented to us since the Alabama decision was filed.
We too think these precedents are sound, well reasoned, and should be followed."
'5 Jenkins v. United States Fire Ins. Co., supra note 8.
16 Morton v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra note 8.
17 Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730 (1958).
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does not mean there should be a straining of meaning of language in order
to bind the insurer, or that, where there is no ambiguity, one should be
invented in order to bind the insurer."' 8 The Ohio courts will undoubtedly
be faced with the issue of construing "collapse" clauses in property damage
insurance policies. It is suggested that the Ohio courts adopt a broad con-
struction of the "collapse" clause which will promote the reasonable ex-
pectation of the insured.
To recover under the policy when a home's walls cracked or bulged "in
such a manner as to materially impair the basic structure," the insured would
have to allow the conditions to worsen to the point where the house would
actually cave in. Such economic waste is not within the intention of the
parties and should not be encouraged by the courts. It is in the insurance
company's interest to assume a smaller liability as in the case of substantial
cracking or bulging rather than the burden of indemnifying for the even-
tual destruction of an insured home. It should be noted that in the face
of the prevailing authority, 19 insurance companies intending that the word
"collapse" be given a strict dictionary definition should expressly define
the term within any property damage insurance contract they issue. If
such a clear definition is not present in the contract, it appears likely that
courts should assert the broad construction of "collapse."
I8 Id. at 158, 151 N.E.2d at 734.
19 Jenkins v. United States Fire Ins. Co., supra note 8; Travelers Fire Ins. Co.
v. Whaley, supra note 7.
